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Burkhard Schafer 
“What a parcel of rogues in a nation’s 
database” – The Scottish ID Database 
and Britain’s asymmetric constitution.1  
That the Internet as a global medium poses unique challenges for legal regulation and 
law, still intimately linked to the nation state, is a common place. Much less studied are 
challenges to ICT governance that are the result of sub-state divisions. As recent 
decades have seen a resurgence of regionalism, in Europe and globally, with several 
groups achieving substantive “devolved” powers in autonomous or semi-autonomous 
regions, this question merits closer scrutiny. Countries with “asymmetric” constitutions 
are a particularly fertile ground to explore the issues that are raised for the use and 
regulation of information technology systems that try to serve local needs while being 
integrated into a global communication infrastructure. This paper uses the discussion 
on a national ID database and e-identity provider for Scotland to explore these issues. 
We will see that even the most advanced technological solutions are still influenced by 
historical events, and in our case lead us back to the 17th century, from there to the 
second World War, and finally to the Scottish independence referendum of 2014. Also, 
much of it will turn out to be the fault of the Germans.  
      
1 “Ye Hypocrites, are these your pranks” 
Following the referendum of 1997, the Parliament of the UK in 
Westminster passed the Scotland Act 1998 that established a de-
volved Scottish Parliament and Government, the “Holyrood Par-
liament”. Its responsibilities and powers are roughly similar to 
that of a German federal state (Bundesland) as far as legislative 
competence is concerned, but fiscal control and ability to raise 
money remained under the 1998 Act mainly with the central gov-
ernment.  
 
 At the 2007 election, the Scottish National Party  (SNP) 
won for the first time a majority in Holyrood. At that time, a La-
bour government in London was pursuing a national ID card pro-
ject for the whole of the UK. The backbone of this scheme was 
going to be a centralised computer database, the National Iden-
tity Register (NIR). Biometric information in the form of finger-
print scans was to be linked to this register. The physical embod-
iment was to be three types of identity cards: 
  
 The National Identity Card, lilac and salmon in colour, 
for British citizens only.  
                                                             
1 This is a substantially extended, updated and revised version of a study initially published as Schafer, Burkhard "An ID database for post-referendum Scot-
land? A legal-contextual analysis." Datenschutz und Datensicherheit-DuD 39.9 (2015): 611-616. 
 The Identification Card, turquoise and green in colour 
for EU citizens living in the UK  
 The Identity Card for Foreign Nationals, blue and pink 
for immigrants from non-EU/EEA countries  
 
Refusal to register was to carry a fine, as was failure to alert the 
authorities that a card had been lost, or that details in the register 
had changed. Control of crime, terrorism prevention, detection 
of benefit fraud and illegal immigration were the stated ration-
ales behind the scheme.   
 
In 2009, the Scottish Government confirmed Scotland's opposi-
tion to ID cards in a letter from Minister for Community Safety 
Fergus Ewing to the UK Government: 
 
"The Scottish Government continues to be completely opposed 
to the National Identity Scheme, and the Scottish Parliament re-
cently supported a call for the UK Government to cancel its plans 
for the National Identity Scheme. […] There is little tangible ev-
idence to suggest ID cards will deliver any of the benefits West-
minster claim: it is far from certain they will do anything to safe-
guard against crime and terrorism, and there are real concerns 
that the cards and the identity database could increase the risk of 
fraud, not reduce it.” 
 
Opposition against this card scheme was widespread, and after 
Labour lost the 2010 national election, it was scrapped by a coa-
lition government of centre-right conservatives (Tory) and cen-
tre-left Liberal Democrats (LibDems).  
  
 In 2011, the SNP was returned to power in the Scottish elections 
with a much enhanced majority.  Three years later, in December 
2014, the SNP-led government in Holyrood published a “minor 
consultation” on the“proposed amendments to the National 
Health Service Central Register (Scotland) Regulations 2006”. 
The proposal, once implemented, will transform the Scottish Na-
tional Health Service (NHS) register (NHSCR) into a full-scale 
population register accessible to over 120 organisations. It will 
create a unique and persistent identifier that facilitates data shar-
ing across agencies, while at the same time increases the reach 
of the database and also the type of information that it contains. 
According to several commentators, it will create the very thing 
that the SNP in Scotland and in Westminster had opposed in 
2009: a National ID database.2  
 
Just as with its 2009 precursor, the new database has created sig-
nificant concerns for privacy protection, The Information Com-
missioner’s Office (ICO) warned that the proposal, which lacks 
a Privacy Impact Assessment, risked breaching data protection 
laws and privacy standards. The ICO also echoed the concern 
that the “creeping use of such identifiers” would eventually lead 
to a national ID card, introduced in circumvention of the demo-
cratic process: “If we are to have a national identity number this 
should be the subject of proper debate and be accompanied by 
suitable safeguards. It should not just happen by default.”3  
 
Such an explicit Act by Parliament seems also essential to 
comply with Article 8 (7) of the EU Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC, which states that ”Member states shall determine the 
conditions under which a national identification number or any 
other identifier of general application may be processed”.  The 
present proposal, if it were to be seen as a national ID system, 
not only fails to specify in sufficient detail how and to what ex-
tend processing will take place. Absent primary legislation to in-
troduce it, it could be questioned if this amounts to a “determi-
nation” by the UK to have an ID scheme in part of its territory – 
a question to which we will return below. We note however the 
issue that will be at the heart of this paper. The UK, as a signatory 
state, is the primary addressee of EU law. The constituent nations 
of the UK – England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland – do 
not interact with the EU directly. As we will see, they remain 
however in varying degrees of autonomy “nations” with their 
own national identities. Art. 4(2) on the Treaty on the European 
Union states that “The Union shall respect the equality of Mem-
ber States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, 
inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitu-
tional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall 
respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the ter-
ritorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safe-
guarding national security”.  
                                                             
2 See e.g. https://scotland.openrightsgroup.org/campaigns/stop-scottish-id-
database; http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2015/02/10/comment-
buried-in-a-minor-consultation-scotland-s-id-cards-p 
 
   On the bases of this provision, it may be argued that the UK, 
whilst being a State under public international law, currently in-
cludes a bundle of four different national identities,.  The ques-
tion then becomes if a) the Scottish National Identity scheme is 
a “National” ID scheme for the purpose of the Data Protection 
Directive, and if so, if b) the UK and the Westminster Parliament, 
or the devolved Holyrood Parliament, are required to make the 
appropriate “determination”.  
  
Before we will come back to this issue, the proposed changes 
in a nutshell:  
 
a) At present, only the National Health Service and some local 
authorities can access the NHSCR for the purpose of identifying 
citizens. This ensures, as a side effect, also observance of the 
purpose limitation principle of Data Protection law. Only health 
related inquiries are likely to be made. In the future, NHSCR will 
provide services to 120 organisations, including police, prisons, 
universities and some publicly owned companies such as Glas-
gow Airport, Quality Meat Scotland and Scottish Canals, Vis-
itScotland or the Bòrd na Gàidhlig (in charge of Gaelic language 
and culture).  
 
b) At present, information about addresses is limited to around 
30% of citizens captured in the NHSCR, the aim is to increase 
this to 100%, partly by data sharing and matching between the 
register and its new users, partly by merging it with the Commu-
nity Health Index Postcode (CHIP).  
 
c) At present, postcode data is only provided consensually, un-
der the new system, this consensual model would shift towards 
mandatory registration (via CHIP). 
 
The proposal states three general aims that are to be achieved: 
 
1) to increase data quality  
 
This would be at the expense of the consensus model which is a 
main source for poor or incomplete data. 
 
2) Extend the ability to access online services using 
Myaccount to a wider range of public services 
 
The new extended system will act as e-identity provider for My-
account, an online system for the delivery of public service in 
Scotland. National Records of Scotland, as administrators of the 
NHSCR will acquire a critical role as an e-identity provider.  
 
 3) Assist with the tracing of certain persons  
 
Explicitly named are children at risk (e.g. children missing 
within the education system) and foreign individuals with out-
standing debts with the NHS. No more specifics are given – one 
of the key complaints by the Information Commissioner’s Of-
fice, since some of these functions are already discharged else-
where, and without further specification could result in tracing 
citizens who for good and lawful reasons do not want to be 
3 https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/consultation-re-
sponses/2015/1043385/ico-response-nhs-central-register-20150225.pdf 
found. This could be for instance vulnerable witnesses, or people 
in fear of abusive partners. 
Finally, and this too is an issue we will need to come 
back to, its aim is to: 
 
4) Enable the identification of Scottish tax payers to en-
sure the accurate allocation of tax receipts associated 
with the Scottish Rate of Income Tax to Scotland 
 
 At least on first sight, it seems that the Scottish Government not 
only aims to introduce the type of database that it initially 
strongly opposed when proposed by the Labour party, the 
method to achieve this looks like a particularly worrying “repur-
posing” of health data for issues such as tax enforcement and po-
licing.  To understand exactly what these changes to the NHSCR 
amount to and if the charge of hypocrisy is merited, we need first 
to understand what the NHSCR is – and for this, a historical anal-
ysis of the origins of the database and the discussion surrounding 
it will be needed. 
 
1.1 “See the front o' battle lour!” 
 The NHSCR is an electronic database held and maintained by 
National Records Office (NRO). It contains basic demographic 
details of everyone born or deceased in Scotland, or who was at 
some point registered with a General Medical Practitioner (GP) 
here. In modern times, its primary purpose is to facilitate the 
movement of medical patient records between Health Boards 
both within Scotland, and between Scottish Health Boards and 
the rest of the UK. Its earlier history though gives us a rich case 
study in the problems of national ID systems.  
The NHSCR grew out of a census held in the UK in 1939 as 
part of the effort to put the UK on war footing. An example of 
wartime emergency legislation, the National Registration Act 
1939 paved the way to a national census (or “enumeration” as it 
was called in law). As part of the census, every person received 
a unique “civil registration number” (based on their address on 
enumeration night, and later on the birth register). This prepared 
the ground for issuing the (short lived) National Identity Card, 
aimed at identifying spies and other enemy agents who might 
have infiltrated the country, issuing of food ration books, and 
identifying eligible adults for conscription.4 It also was used to 
identify children for evacuation purposes, which made the ad-
dress an essential part of the information. Other data collected 
were names, gender, age, occupation, marital status and mem-
bership in the armed forces or auxiliary services.  
Most of these purposes became obsolete after the war had 
ended, though rationing continued for a few years. Introduced as 
emergency legislation with a sunset clause, the law that had en-
abled the census nonetheless proved remarkably difficult to get 
rid off.  In 1946, Parliament passed the first of what would be-
come a series of  “Emergency Laws (Transitional Provisions) 
Acts”, which perpetuated several wartime laws, before they be-
came ultimately repealed in the 1956 Emergency Laws (Repeal) 
Act.  The universally unpopular ID card system did not survive 
quite as long. It had been a controversial piece of legislation even 
under the tense conditions of 1939. The speeches of two Mem-
bers of Parliament (MPs) at the time are particularly insightful. 
 
                                                             
4 See http://www.nrscotland.gov.uk/statistics-and-data/nhs-central-regis-
ter/about-the-register/the-history-of-the-register for an authoritative “participant 
The Labour MP for the constituency of Farnworth, Georg 
Tomlinson, who had been elected in a by election just the previ-
ous year, said: 
 
"It may be that there is a necessity for compiling a register, but 
here you have the possibility of people being stopped and asked 
whether they have or have not lost their cards. You may chal-
lenge a dozen people and you find one who has committed an 
offence. It will not help a scrap to win the war, but there is the 
possibility of penalising somebody who is perfectly innocent be-
cause we have passed a law for another purpose entirely" 
 
Here we find two ideas that had a lasting impact. First, Tom-
linson can be said to have invented what would later become, 
under Data Protection law, the purpose specification principle, 
but he also anticipated that once data was collected, “mission 
creep” was all but inevitable. Second, we find a separation be-
tween the legal requirement to carry a physical Identity Card and 
the database that underpins such a card. It is only the former, not 
the latter that is seen problematic. At a time when the capacity to 
search and cross-reference archives was very limited, this is not 
a surprising position to take. However this attitude would remain 
a defining feature of public debate on identity cards and identity 
registers up to the present day, when the capacity of databases 
and e-registers has vastly improved.  Back in 1939, John Tinker 
MP expressed the concerns thus:  
 
"We do not want to be stopped in the street by any person an-
ywhere and to be forced to produce a card. If that kind of thing 
begins, we shall be afraid of people meeting us and asking for 
our cards. One thing that we do respect in this country is our 
freedom from being challenged on every occasion to produce 
something to prove that we are certain persons"  
 
The requirement to carry a physical ID card became subject of 
a criminal trial in 1950, when Clarence Henry Willcock became 
the last person in the UK to be prosecuted under the wartime act. 
He had been challenged by a police constable of the name Harold 
Muckle, to present his identity card at a police station within 48 
hours. Willock refused as a matter of principle, saying: "I am a 
Liberal and I am against this sort of thing". During his subse-
quent trial, where leading liberal politicians of his day offered 
their service as legal councils for free, he argued that as the stated 
purpose of ID cards had lapsed with the end of the war, citizens 
were under no obligation to produce them. This was to no avail, 
and he was convicted and charged the pricely sum of 10 shillings, 
approximately £11 in today’s money.  
He duly appealed the decision,. Even though the Court 
of Appeal upheld the conviction in  Willcock v Muckle [1951] 2 
ALL ER 367, Lord Goddard, the then Lord Chief Justice of Eng-
land and Wales, showed strong sympathy for the defence: 
 
"This Act was passed for security purposes, and not for the 
purposes for which, apparently, it is now sought to be used. To 
use Acts of Parliament, passed for particular purposes during 
war, in times when the war is past, except that technically a state 
of war exists, tends to turn law-abiding subjects into lawbreak-
ers, which is a most undesirable state of affairs." 
 
account” see Vivian, Sylvanus.(1951) "History of national registration." Lon-
don: Cabinet Office Historical Branch 
Here too we find the fear of mission creep, but also again the 
focus on police powers and their right to demand identification 
from citizens.5 We also note in passing that despite strong objec-
tions, the courts were unable to invalidate the law. This too is a 
feature of the UK constitutional settlement, with a strong empha-
sis on parliamentary sovereignty and a correspondingly weak(er) 
control by the courts, which can not normally invalidate primary 
legislation.  This only changed, to a degree, when in 1989 the 
UK enacted the Human Rights Act. While the Human Rights Act 
still does not allow the courts to invalidate legislation enacted by 
Parliament, it allows a number of nominated courts to issue a 
“declaration of incompatibility”. In these cases, the law remains 
in force up to such a time when (and if) Parliament removes the 
incompatibility.  
 
Lord Goddard, in his speech in Willcock v Muckle, went as far 
as he could to express something very similar, but without the 
more serious legal consequences that such a ruling would carry 
today. Nonetheless, when the Labour Government of Attlee was 
defeated in the general election of 1951, the new Conservative 
government under Winston Churchill abolished the law in 1952, 
to great support from the general public but against the expressed 
wishes of police and security services. Here, we note another 
emerging pattern. While subsequently both Conservative and La-
bour governments tried to reintroduce ID cards, support for them 
tended to be particularly high under Labour administrations and 
the political left. Conservatives by contrast tended to emphasise 
that the very concept is an alien, foreign idea, something they 
identify with the French or German “administrative” state, and 
thus not “properly British”.6 Not having a British Identity Card 
thus became part of British identity.  
 
1.2 “Be blest with health, and peace, and 
sweet content!” 
While 1951 saw the end of national ID cards, the database or 
register that underpinned them stayed in existence. Governments 
rarely give up information about citizens once they collected 
them, and soon a new use for the census data emerged.  
From the 19th century onwards, the state had taken on a more 
and more active role in providing public health care, not only in 
the UK but throughout Europe. During the interwar years, it had 
become clear however that the UK was significantly lagging be-
hind continental Europe and the US, as measured in international 
league tables. The Local Government Act of 1929 had hoped to 
bring much needed reform, but despite general improvements in 
local administration failed to deliver for health services. William 
Alexander Robson, one of the most influential academic com-
mentators during that time, decried the ‘"multiplication of health 
authorities and the disintegration of function”, and was in partic-
ular concerned about the “failure to envisage the health of the 
community at different ages and different stages".7 In 1942, this 
insight became one of the three core principles of what was to 
become the National Health Service, when Beveridge's famous 
                                                             
5 see also Joinson, A. N., Paine, C., Buchanan, T., and Reips, U. (2006) 
Watching me, watching you: privacy attitudes and reactions to identity card im-
plementation scenarios in the United Kingdom. Journal of Information Science, 
Vol. 32(4): 334-343. 
6 Agar, Jon. "Modern horrors: British identity and identity cards." Document-
ing individual identity: the development of state practices in the modern world 
1 (2001): 101-120  p 102 
report on “Social Insurance and Allied Services” envisioned a 
welfare state that provided “from cradle to grave”.8 Of course, 
any hope to address Robson’s concern would be facilitated, in 
due time, by having a “sticky” single identifier for health service 
providers that allowed to track an individual through their ages 
and stages in life.  
 
Keeping track of an individual over time was only one of the 
requirements that were to come with a National Health Service. 
As important was the need to track individuals through space. 
Despite considerable differences in detail, health provisions in 
England and Scotland at the time were blighted by a chaotic and 
highly fragmented system of service provision and governance. 
A particular problem was the co-existence of a private and a pub-
lic hospital system, which, in the words of Bertrand Dawson, au-
thor of the influential Dawson report of 1920, resulted in “dupli-
cating and even conflicting, without machinery in existence for 
coordinating their activities".9 According to another report they 
were "self governing institutions, jealous of their independence 
and only loosely associated with each other”. In South Wales 
alone, 93 public hospitals were "governed" by 46 local authori-
ties. Thrown into the mix were a further 48 voluntary hospitals 
that operated totally independently of each other and any state 
control.10 Local resistance by these independent bodies against 
any form of more streamlined administration was fierce, and, 
supported by the medical associations, successful in preventing 
any reform in the interwar years.   
 
This chaotic state of affair was however unable to cope with 
the demands the war made on Britain, especially once civilian 
causalities were mounting as a result of German air raids. An 
Emergency Medical Service was put in place, centrally con-
trolled and with significant new infrastructure investment. As 
contemporary observers noted: "the bombing plane, by trans-
forming the nature of warfare, has forced on us a transformation 
of our medical services”. Or as Charles Webster put it in modern 
days more acerbically: “The Luftwaffe achieved in month what 
had defeated politicians and planners for at least two dec-
ades”. 11The considerable improvement of this new approach 
soon became manifest, and it became clear that after the war, a 
return to the old system was inconceivable.  
 
In 1941, the  Government announced a proposal for a compre-
hensive hospital service, which however had a significant degree 
of “localism”, putting local authorities in charge of providing it. 
The Beveridge Report of December 1942 recommended in 1942 
a National Health Service with General Practitioners who would 
work though regional health centres and hospitals. Support in the 
medical profession existed for even further decentralisation and 
an insurance based system that centred around independent GPs 
 
A 1944 “White Paper” finally included the founding principles 
of the NHS as a nationalised health provider: 
 
7 Robson, William Alexander. The development of local government. Allen & 
Unwin, 1937 p.333. 
8 Abel‐Smith, Brian. "The Beveridge report: Its origins and outcomes." Inter-
national Social Security Review (1992) 45#1‐2 pp 5–1 
9 Speeches by Lord Dawson of Penn, The Times, 19 Oct 1937 
10 Webster, Charles. The national health service: A political history. Oxford 
University Press, 2002.p. 5 
11 Webster 2002 p. 6 
- all services are to be provided free at the point of use and 
financed through general taxation 
 
- Everyone, independent of income, nationality, or age is eli-
gible for care. 
 
The last point is of particular importance for our discussion. It 
meant that questions of (national) identity were less relevant for 
the new system than one might have thought. It had from its in-
ception a duty to also provide services for foreigners temporarily 
visiting the UK (undoubtedly also necessitated by the large scale 
displacement of people during the war), who were not taxpayers 
and hence also not part of a prior registration or identification 
system. 
 
When after the war Clement Attlee's Labour Party government 
tasked Aneurin Bevan with implementing these ideas, it soon be-
came obvious that the idea to leave control with local authorities 
was in this form not feasible, and that the existing system needed 
a more fundamental reform. He decided that "the only thing to 
do was to create an entirely new hospital service, to take over the 
voluntary hospitals, and to take over the local government hos-
pitals and to organise them as a single hospital service". This re-
sulted in a more monolithic and homogenous entity than the war-
time discussions had anticipated. Yet it still showed that it was 
based on a compromise between groups favouring a highly de-
centralised and regionalised approach, and those favouring a 
stronger role for a centralised administration. One consequence 
of this compromise was to keep the health systems of Scotland 
and England separate entities, with entirely different lines of 
command and responsibility, and different funding streams. The 
NHS in England and Wales was established by the National 
Health Service Act 1946, which received Royal Assent on 6 No-
vember 1946.  NHS Scotland was created by the National Health 
Service (Scotland) Act 1947.   
 
The balance between centralism and regionalism was achieved 
by a “tripartite” system: 
 
Firstly, hospital sector became nationalised, with (In England) 
14 Regional Hospital Boards with overall responsibility to coor-
dinate health services, and below them 400 Hospital Manage-
ment Committees responsible for the administration of hospitals. 
University associated teaching hospitals had different arrange-
ments – they played for historical reasons also a particularly 
strong role in Scotland.  
 
Secondly, local authorities took on many of the roles the old 
“Poor laws” had assigned to parish councils, including vaccina-
tion programs, health education and midwife services.   
 
Crucially, the main responsibility for primary Care was to lie 
with General Practitioners (GP) – the German “Hausarzt” - who 
remained semi-independent. Payment came from the state, but 
“followed the patients” in that GPs were paid for each person on 
their list. As points of first contact, they also created the health 
records of their patients. Because payment was by number of 
people recorded on their lists, the creation of administrative rec-
ords that identified individual patients became part and parcel of 
                                                             
12 http://www.ndc.scot.nhs.uk/Dictionary-A-Z/Definitions/in-
dex.asp?Search=C&ID=128&Title=CHI%20Number 
their role. Since, as we discussed above, people are entitled to 
NHS treatment independent of their nationality or place of resi-
dence, these patient registers included people who would not be 
part of any other governmental register or data set.  
 
This set-up immediately created an obvious problem. As an 
increasingly mobile workforce moved between Health Boards, 
(not even counting refugees, internally displaced people whose 
houses were still in ruins, relatives of the soldiers of allied forces) 
or indeed between Scotland and England, they would end up on 
several lists, one for each GP whose services they used. This pro-
liferation of lists made reliable payment to GPs impossible, and 
also made it difficult to ensure that the current GP got access to 
the health records of his patients when they had been created by 
a GP elsewhere in the UK. A method needed to be found to track 
an individual across different care providers – and the census 
data provided just that information. As it had recorded people 
irrespectively of their nationality or employment status, it 
matched the requirement of a health service free for everybody. 
Because it was the result of a central effort (though with separate 
registers for England and Scotland), it avoided duplication of 
IDs. So while the national ID cards were discarded, the census 
data that underpinned them found a new use as a central enabler 
of the modern welfare state and formed the core of the National 
Health Service Central Register 
 
1.3 “Then gently scan your brother man” 
 
In Scotland, maintaining this register, the NHSCR, became one 
of the functions of the General Register Office for Scotland 
(GROS), already charged since 1854 with recording all births 
and deaths in Scotland.  With this system in place, the aim of the 
modern welfare state and the NHS in particular, to provide ser-
vices from cradle to grave, could be supported administratively. 
In 2011, GROS and the National Archives of Scotland (NAS) 
merged to form the National Records of Scotland (NRS), which 
is the body now charged with maintaining the NHSCR.  
 
When registering with the NHS, patients receive a unique and 
persistent identifier, their unique citizen reference number (CHI) 
Number. This number is created from the patient's date of birth 
followed by four digits: two random digits, a digit identifying 
gender at birth (odd for men, even for women) and a check 
digit.12 Crucially, the NHSCR does not contain patient’s health 
records (with the exception of that of certain types of cancer pa-
tients for research purposes). It enables however to locate a 
health record wherever it is held. At this point, we can see why 
the Scottish SNP can argue that its proposal is nothing like the 
UK database it had rejected in 2009: NHSCR is not (just) a na-
tional database, rather, it is a register of all customers of the NHS, 
domestic and foreign. It is also not linked to a physical card, let 
alone one mandatory to carry  - as we saw the main focus of op-
position to national ID systems in the UK. 
 
However, while the NHS was the historical corner stone of the 
modern welfare state in the UK, it provides of course only one 
important element of it. A whole range of services and benefits 
are provided, many administered locally and facing similar prob-
lems as those that had been experienced by the young NHS sixty 
years ago. In Scotland for instance, pensioners are entitled to free 
bus passes. But since many bus companies are run by local coun-
cils, a way had to be found to identify pensioners and make their 
entitlement portable across municipal boundaries.  
 
It is therefore maybe surprising that it took until 2004 before 
politicians realised that the NHSCR could also support these 
types of  “public service delivery”. That year, NRS was asked to 
provide the unique reference number created for NHS customers 
also to the equivalent index of customers of Scottish local au-
thorities. To pre-empt concerns, only data of people who had 
specifically asked to be included in the local authority database 
was added. This new and widened remit of NHSCR soon became 
linked to the National Entitlement Card –  a multi-application 
smartcard that according to the local councils that promote them 
are  
 
• quick to use - just flash it over a reader and it scans 
automatically; 
 
• convenient - a single card with many uses helping you 
to reduce the number of cards you need to carry.13 
 
Depending on the local council, the card can be used e.g. as 
library card, cashless catering within schools, taxi travel for dis-
abled people, or as proof of age for pupils. 
 
Here we can see why the critics of the new scheme fail to see 
the significant difference to a national ID card system: by com-
bining a mandatory but card-free registration system whose pur-
pose initially was national defence, and became central for na-
tional health as a public good, with a carded but not mandatory 
system, the resulting database does create a de facto mandatory, 
universal and nation-wide ID and ID card system.  
 
 An additional layer of complexity was added when the Scot-
tish government introduced as part of its “Digital Future agenda” 
the “Myaccount” facility, soft launched in Edinburgh in 2014. 
Myaccount is the digital equivalent to the Entitlement card – a 
single online account that allows registered users to access gov-
ernment services. Participation is (so far) voluntary and all ser-
vices remain available offline. As more and more government 
services are moved online, not just in Scotland but throughout 
the western world, this is not an unusual development. An e-
identity is a necessary precondition for such a system, and both 
on the level of the UK (and by implication England) and on the 
Scottish level, steps are taken to create one.  However, on the 
details of how such an e-identity should work,  Scotland and the 
UK differ in interesting ways. For the UK, the Cabinet Office in 
London envisions a federated system where private sector pro-
viders will become accredited e-identity providers. In Scotland, 
this role was taken on by the government through NHSCR. This 
is not just a minor technical detail, it reflects a deep and system-
atic difference in political culture between these two constituent 
parts of the UK, and is an explicit policy decision: 
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14 http://blogs.scotland.gov.uk/digital/2014/04/07/myaccount-signing-in-to-
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“The Scottish Government considers that the people of Scot-
land will prefer a public sector, not-for-profit body to be respon-
sible for “Myaccount”.  This contrasts with the UK Govern-
ment’s approach of individuals setting up an account with a pri-
vate sector body.”14  
 
In the international discussion on privacy, the US approach 
with its trust in companies is often contrasted with the European 
trust in governments. Within the microcosms of the UK, we find 
the same juxtaposition. Post-war Scotland tended to return gov-
ernments that were to the left of the UK-wide majority, England, 
especially southern England, favoured more conservative poli-
cies. Support for the public sector in Scotland remains very 
strong; privatisation is driven by policies formulated in London. 
This also maps to the wider issue of attitudes to the EU, with 
Scotland generally more EU friendly, England more euro-scep-
tical and oriented towards the US.  
 
By accentuating the role of the government to certify and pro-
tect e-Identities, the Scottish approach aligns therefore on first 
sight well with the overall political landscape and a narrative of 
Scottish exceptionalism, which defines itself systematically also 
“against” the politics of London and the City.  
 
1.4 What's done we partly may 
compute 
 
Thus viewed in its historical context, the latest proposals to 
further extend the coverage of the NHSCR can be seen as a log-
ical extension of post-war Scottish (identity) politics: Where the 
2009 proposal for the UK ID card had emphasised fear of crime, 
illegal immigration and the social problem of benefit cheats, the 
Scottish approach accentuates the positive role of the welfare 
state and the need of service delivery to the infirm. With the pos-
sible exception of “tracking foreigners”, it follows the trajectory 
of the 1939 census described above and is unlike its abandoned 
UK predecessor essentially inclusive. It is not based on national-
ity but either residency or mere use of services, and for this rea-
son alone indeed not a “national” identity database in the tech-
nical sense. Unlike the UK ID proposal, no criminal sanctions 
are proposed – yet – for not carrying a correct ID, nor is the 
NHSCR database linked – yet – to biometric identifiers the way 
the 2009 proposal was. It even becomes understandable why the 
measure was hidden in a minor consultation, without a full de-
bate in the Scottish Parliament.15 If the discussion is framed as a 
minor administrative-technical question about service delivery 
as opposed to a major change in policy to address significant ex-
ternal challenges such as terrorism and crime, technocratic rather 
than policy issues are the focus.  
 
However, this socially inclusive narrative hides the significant 
privacy concerns that the 2014 approach shares with the aban-
doned 2009 proposal. It also ignores that the question of central-
ised and persistent identifiers, as opposed to federated and tem-
poral solutions, is orthogonal to the public sector- private sector 
dichotomy.16 This means that more privacy friendly solutions 
15 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-31715798 
16 the author has to declare an interest at this point. I was consultant in a 
Cabinet Office study on e-identity for the UK, and also worked on a separate 
that preserve the structural advantages of the “trusted third party” 
model favoured by the UK Cabinet Office seem highly feasible 
also for Scotland, even within a context of public sector govern-
ance.   
 
Evaluated from this perspective, the concerns about the ID 
consultation are not (just) what the new enhanced system will 
disclose about citizens. Rather, it is the lack of detail about in-
tended application, the lack of any recognition that while the ex-
tended database will not be a national ID system, it can easily be 
extended to become one, and given this, the choice of technical 
implementation and lack of parliamentary scrutiny. As the Infor-
mation Commissioner in his response pointed out, not only is a 
Privacy Impact Assessment missing, the description of the in-
tended applications remain so ill defined that a proper propor-
tionality assessment will be difficult to carry out. Even after sub-
stantial external pressure the government defeated in a narrow 
60:65 vote an amendment to give MSPs at least the opportunity 
to discuss these measures in full.  
 
So how should we judge the proposal? Should we judge its 
proponents gently, the way Robert Burns, Scotland’s national 
poet urged us to judge each other always, for  “What's done we 
partly may compute/ But know not what's resisted”? Or should 
we consider it as a disingenuous power grab by an administration 
and remember Burn’s words that “Some books are lies frae end 
to end”? The answer attempted here tries to find a third way. 
While the proposal raises serious concerns for privacy in partic-
ular, and also for the democratic process, these are not best un-
derstood as merely a cynical ploy. Rather, they are the result of 
long-term dynamics of UK political history. Some of these we 
encountered already in the historical background narrative of the 
NHSCR. It left the UK with an “asymmetric” constitution, where 
each constituent part (England, Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland) has different degrees of autonomy and responsibility, 
and where the UK’s four nations were never were fully coordi-
nated with each other or the central government in a systematic 
way. Underlying these are informal and contingent ways to un-
derstand and conceptualise what “national identity” means, a 
process where regional identities (Scottish, Irish, English, 
Welsh) and federal (British) identity remain in constant flux and 
are persistently renegotiated. This creates inevitable tensions 
when the law is asked to “fix” these identities in regulation. But 
“pinning down” identity through laws is necessary not just for 
“enabling” laws on collection and sharing of data across the UK, 
but also “protective” data protection rules, as any decision on 
what counts as “identity” or “membership in the database” for 
the purpose of the law risk pre-empting highly charged political 
discussions. In such an environment, low-key administrative ac-
tions visibly separated from governmental functions, e.g. as pro-
moted here by a neutral body like the National Archives, provide 
mechanism for resolving problems without having to enter the 
much more symbolically charged political arena. 
 
This becomes particularly clear if we look at the fourth of the 
intended uses of the new system, to identify taxpayers liable to 
                                                             
project with Police Scotland on a federated trusted third party approach that 
while in public service ownership, intentionally avoided a single persistent 
identifier system.  
17 For an accessible account of the Darien scheme, see Watt (2014) The 
Price of Scotland: Darien, Union and the Wealth of Nations. Luath Press Ltd, 
for a comprehensive   
the new “Scottish” income tax. It is this new power of the Scot-
tish executive, won in a complex political process, that ulti-
mately forces the hand of the administration. It requires a deter-
mination of “being Scottish” that does not apply to any of the 
other parts of the UK, as it is based on a power that previously 
only existed on the level of the UK. To understand this context, 
we once again have to look deep back in history.  
2 “Bought and sold for English Gold” 
 
At the beginning of the 18th century, Scotland and the Scottish 
economy found themselves in the grip of a deep financial crisis. 
At a time when globalisation promised investors in many coun-
tries unimaginable riches and massive returns on investments by 
investing in trade with the colonies, Scotland feared to be left 
behind. To establish Scotland as a global player, its aristocrats 
and merchants, town councils and guilds had raised money to 
finance an audacious scheme that would bring part of the bounty 
that the Americas promised to Scotland. Eventually, between 
around 20% of the wealth of Scotland (and half of its GDP) was 
going to flow in a project by the Company of Scotland, founded 
by an Act of the Scottish Parliament in 1695, to establish a col-
ony in Darien, on the Isthmus of Panama.17 The project was to 
become a disaster, with only a few hundred of the 2500 settlers 
that had sailed to Panama returning alive, defeated by illness, 
starvation and the Spanish army. Never before had investments 
been spread so widely across the population, with many private 
citizens and public bodies investing money they could not afford 
to lose.18 Never before affected a failed company so many in 
their daily lives. While it would be overly simplistic to see the 
failure of the Darien scheme as the main reason why in 1707, 
Scotland would seize to exists as an independent nation, it defi-
nitely contributed to its demise. Article 15 of the Act of Union 
granted £398,085 10s sterling from English coffers to Scotland, 
a sum known as the “Equivalent”. While technically an insurance 
against future liability of Scotland for the English national debt, 
it was de facto also a compensation scheme for the investors, 
with 58.6% of the sum allocated to the shareholders and creditors 
of the Company of Scotland. 
 
Fast forward. At the beginning of the 21th century, Scotland 
and the Scottish economy found themselves in the grip of a deep 
financial crisis. At a time when globalisation promised investors 
in many countries unimaginable riches and massive returns on 
investments by investing in trade with the former colonies, Scot-
land feared to be left behind. To establish Scotland as a global 
player, it’s major banks such as the Bank of Scotland and the 
Royal Bank of Scotland, and through them also small investors 
such as ordinary workers and tradesmen, town councils and pen-
sion funds had raised money to finance an audacious scheme that 
would bring part of the bounty that the Americas promised to 
Scotland. Attracted by a buoying housing market in the US, Scot-
tish banks went on an acquisition spree that included the US 
mortgage bank Charter One, and investment in the more risky 
18 For an analysis see Jones (2001) The Bold Adventurers': A Quantitative 
Analysis of the Darien Subscription List (1696). Journal of Scottish Historical 
Studies 21, no. 1 22-42. 
segments of the US mortgage security market. The project was 
to become a disaster, with only a small percentage of the invest-
ment returning to Scotland. Only once before had investments 
been spread so widely across the population, with many private 
citizens and public bodies investing money they could not afford 
to lose. Only once before affected a failed company so many in 
their daily lives. While it would be overly simplistic to see the 
aggressive expansion policy and subsequent collapse of the Scot-
tish banks as the main reason why in 2014, Scotland would vote 
by a small margin against becoming an independent country 
again, it definitely contributed to the Yes vote’s demise. The 
massive bailout needed from the UK government, totalling 
£65bn, undermined the economic case for independence and re-
minded people of the benefits of a fiscal union.  
 
From the events of the 18th century through to the devolution 
referendum in 1997, the financial crisis in 2008 and the inde-
pendence referendum in 2014, we can see events unfolding that 
would leave the UK with a constitutional settlement which poses 
unique challenges for legal regulation, and none more so than for 
the legal regulations that pertain to a person’s identity. For ques-
tions of national and cultural identity are deeply intertwined with 
all of these developments. 
 
 We find a first trace of this issue already with the Darien 
Scheme mentioned above. Ostensibly, it was marketed at a 
newly found national pride in Scotland – the “Scottishness” of 
the scheme was a key selling point, and subscription seen as na-
tional duty and part of Scottish identity: Lord Basil Hamilton 
commented that ‘he won’t be looked upon as a true Scotchman 
that is against it’.19 Even further went the law that created the 
Bank of Scotland in the same year, 1659. The final clause of its 
founding Act (repealed only in 1920) made all foreign-born pro-
prietors naturalised Scotsmen "to all Intents and Purposes what-
soever".20 If we think of the subscription lists as an early “ID da-
tabase”, then its definition of national ID was an inclusive, econ-
omy-oriented one: invest in Scotland to be Scottish.  
 
The collapse of the scheme was followed swiftly by the Treaty 
of Union in 1706, which gave Scotland the promise of financial 
relieve, while resolving English concerns of a catholic monarch 
at some point in the future ascending the Scottish throne.  Two 
separate and symmetrical Acts by the Parliaments of England 
and Scotland, implemented the treaty, the “Acts of Union”. In 
1707 the Parliament of England passed the Union with Scotland 
Act and in the same year the Parliament of Scotland passed the 
Union with England Act. Having shared a Monarch since 1603, 
the Union of the Parliaments became legal reality on 1 May 1707 
when the Scottish Parliament and the English Parliament united 
to form the Parliament of Great Britain. This new Parliament was 
based in the Building of one of the old ones, the Palace of West-
minster in London. This choice became emblematic for one of 
the persistent problems with national identity in the UK: For 
England and the English, there is no sharp demarcation between 
English and British identity, they seep into each other – West-
minster, while formalistic legally only Parliament for the UK, is 
also seen as the de facto Parliament for England. For Scotland 
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and the Scots, Scottish and British (and indeed European) iden-
tity are more strictly delineated, even for unionists who empha-
sise the benefits of continuing membership in the UK.  
 
Under the terms of the Treaty, Scotland maintained its legal 
system and with it a significant part of its administrative and ju-
dicial structure.  This was in marked difference to Wales, which 
had at that time already been fully integrated into the Kingdom 
of England.  The Laws in Wales Acts had extended the English 
legal system and its administration to Wales, creating a single 
state and jurisdiction. For a discussion of “identity”, looking a 
bit more closely at the Act is of interest: 
 
"(4) some rude and ignorant People have made Distinction and 
Diversity between the King's Subjects of this Realm, and his 
Subjects of the said Dominion and Principality of Wales, 
whereby great Discord, Variance, Debate, Division, Murmur and 
Sedition hath grown between his said Subjects; 
 
(5) His Highness therefore of a singular Zeal, Love and Favour 
that he beareth towards his Subjects of his said Dominion of 
Wales, minding and intending to reduce them to the perfect Or-
der, Notice and Knowledge of his Laws of this Realm, and ut-
terly to extirp all and singular the sinister Usages and Customs 
differing from the same..." 
 
Distinctive identities are inimical to union and peace, and no-
where more so when they result in distinctive legal status. This 
also requires cultural amalgamation, with distinctive  national 
identifiers such as language, dress or customs becoming out-
lawed. 
 
Ireland as the fourth of the "sister kingdoms" was not included 
in the Union, though it tried to leverage the event to this aim. 
Both its Houses of the Parliament of Ireland urged Queen Anne 
in 1707, asking "May God put it in your royal heart to add greater 
strength and lustre to your crown, by a still more comprehensive 
Union" – an expression with additional poignancy today in the 
context of the European project of a “closer and closer union”. 
The (newly formed) British government did not respond to the 
invitation, and it would take almost another century before the 
Union with Ireland finally came on January the First 1801. In the 
meantime, the Kingdom of Ireland remained separate but legally 
subordinate to Great Britain.  
 
The Treaty of Union comprised 25 articles, not fewer than 15 
of which were economic in nature and aimed at creating a mon-
etary union and a free trade area. This focus on economic maters, 
together with the above mentioned “equivalent”, was seen by 
large parts of the population, which remained deeply hostile to 
the Treaty, as a corrupt betrayal. It led to Burn’s famous dictum: 
We’re bought and sold for English Gold 
What a parcel of rogues in a Nation. 
 
Scotland kept the independent Church of Scotland, and the 
Court of Session as highest Scottish appeal court was to "remain 
in all time coming within Scotland", to adjudicate according to 
Scots law which would "remain in the same force as before". It 
20 http://www.rampantscotland.com/SCM/story.htm 
provided for Scottish representation in both Houses of Parlia-
ment, but left most of the day-to-day governance of Scotland in 
the hands of the “College of Justice”. This body comprises the 
Court of Session, the High Court of Justiciary, and the Office of 
the Accountant of Court as the supreme courts of Scotland, and 
the Faculty of Advocates, the Society of Writers to Her Majesty's 
Signet and the Society of Solicitors in the Supreme Courts of 
Scotland as its associated body – rule of law became thus 
(self)rule by lawyers.  
 
We have to fast-forward through the next 300 years, interest-
ing as they are for a discussion of the interaction between cul-
tural, political and legal notions of “identity”. The bloody upris-
ings against the Union in 1715 and 1745 failed to break up the 
UK, but caused a period of systematic hostility to the outward 
signs of Scottish (or more precisely, Highland) identity. This cul-
minated in the Highland Clearances, which saw the large-scale 
removals of the indigenous populations of the Highlands and the 
active suppression of their language and culture.21  
In the mid-19th century however, we find renewed calls for 
“Scottish Home rule”, just as we find them for Ireland at that 
time. Unlike Ireland however, this change in attitude was buoyed 
by a sudden and emphatic embrace by Victorian England of 
Scottish culture  - or rather, a romanticist vision of Scottish cul-
ture recreated in the literary salons of London.  Many of the icons 
that we identify today with Scottish culture and Scottish identity 
were reinvented at the time and imbued with a manufactured his-
torical pedigree. Of these, only one ought to be mentioned here. 
The tartan, the multi-coloured criss-crossed weaving pattern as-
sociated with the Scottish kilts, had been outlawed in 1746 by 
the Dress Act as on of many legal measures to extinguish the 
Highland cultural identity. It had however never been an identi-
fier of clan membership – at best, regional fashion styles and dif-
ferences could be established. Since they were created using nat-
ural dyes, weavers would use whatever plants were locally avail-
able and in season, resulting in rapidly changing colour schemes 
only loosely related to geographic areas. They lacked with ne-
cessity the uniform reproducibility that is necessary for an iden-
tity signifier. Modern Victorian technology and the invention of 
artificial dyes meant that these restrictions had become irrele-
vant, now the same colour pattern could be reproduced again and 
again. The idea that the colour of the tartan acted as an ID card 
for clan membership was thus born as a faux history in this en-
vironment, and enabled by technology. But it was only in 2009, 
and again enabled by modern technology, that the tartan received 
legal recognition as a personal identifier.  On 9 October 2008, 
the Scottish Parliament passed the "Scottish Register of Tartans 
Bill" which set the legal framework for an electronic register of 
tartan weaves. Launched on the on 5 February 2009, the Regis-
ter’s website contains specification for over 4000 tartans, and is 
maintained by the Scottish National Archives – the same body 
also tasked, as we have seen, for curating the nascent Scottish ID 
database.  
 
Back to our analysis of the historical trajectory that ultimately 
leads us the contemporary “Scottish Identity” that a Scottish ID 
card would have to capture. The discussion on Irish Home Rule 
became a central aspect of UK politics in the late 19th century, 
with similar debates regarding Scotland also present, but not as 
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predominant. From the Easter Rising of 1916 to the final truce of 
1923, a series of armed conflicts resulted in the eventual partition 
of Ireland between Northern Ireland that remained a part of the 
UK, and the Republic of Ireland as an independent state. From a 
legal perspective though, UK constitutional law remains ambiv-
alent to this new national identity – granting for instance Irish 
citizens -  as only nationality in the EU  - the right to vote in UK 
parliamentary elections, thus continuing to include them in the 
UK “demos”. 
 
While the Second World War had pushed segregationist senti-
ment to the very margins of political discourse, the 1950s and 
60s saw a resurgence of Scottish nationalist feeling. John Mac-
Cormick, father of the legal philosopher Neil, had succeeded for 
some time in uniting a fragmented political movement (also by 
reversing the Scottish Nationalist policy of opposing the draft at 
the outbreak of the war) and in 1951, his non-partisan Scottish 
Covenant  Association managed not only to “liberate” the stone 
of Destiny from the Westminster House of Parliament, but also 
to deliver a petition with over 2m signatures (out of a population 
of around 5m) asking for a devolved Scottish Assembly. The di-
rect political impact of the petition was low, also because ques-
tions would be raised bout the authenticity of some of the signa-
tures – without the ability to use an official register of voters, the 
ability of the SCA to ascertain the identity of the signatories was 
limited.  
 
 The idea of a public, democratic decision on the constitutional 
makeup of the UK however had taken hold. In 1973, under 
highly contested conditions, a referendum was held in Northern 
Ireland – boycotted by the main nationalist parties, it returned a 
resounding majority for the status quo and Northern Ireland’s 
continuing membership in the UK. In 1979, a dual referendum 
was held in Wales and Scotland. In Wales, a majority rejected 
the proposal for a Welsh assembly with legislative powers, in 
Scotland, a majority voted in favour but failed to achieve the re-
quired 40% of the total eligible electorate. In 1997, Welsh and 
Scottish voters were again asked to the ballot boxes. In Wales, 
they were asked the single question: Should there be a Welsh 
assembly with some law-making power? Scotland was asked two 
questions: “Should there be a Scottish Parliament” and “If there 
is a Scottish Parliament should it have tax-varying powers”. In-
teresting again, for our purposes, is the “franchise” or the identity 
of the “demos” for this referendum with its tremendous conse-
quences for the UK and Scotland: Residency was again the main 
eligibility criterion, which means citizens who described them-
selves as English but lived in Scotland had the vote, whereas 
Scots living in England were excluded. Excluded were also all 
expatriates living outside the UK, even though they had received 
the vote for parliamentary elections in 1983. Included, on the 
other hand, were EU citizens resident in Scotland.  
 
There are two ways one can think about this “inclusive” defi-
nition of the franchise in a referendum that was after all about 
national identity. The more cynical explanation saw the referen-
dum as an attempt by the Labour Government in London to stave 
off demands for full independence. Labour ministers stressed 
that devolution was about localism and therefore residence, and 
therefore also not raising issue of "Scottishness" or affinity with 
Scotland more broadly. This avoided, rather than settled the issue 
of who, in the eyes of the law, is “Scottish”, an issue to which 
we will have to return below.  However, as we saw above, there 
was also a historical precedent of sorts for this model: Just as 
investment in Scotland had come with the legal entitlement to 
citizenship in the Darien scheme, so now, “investing in” Scot-
land by living, working and paying taxes was what counted.  
 
In the event, Wales voted with the smallest of margins for a 
devolved Assembly, Scotland with a strong majority for recon-
vening the Scottish parliament, and with a somewhat smaller ma-
jority that it should have tax varying powers.  
 
In response, the UK Parliament passed the Scotland Act 1998, 
creating the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Executive. Empha-
sising the continuity with the past, on the 12. May 1999, Winie 
Ewing, as oldest elected MSP, opened the first meeting with the 
words “The Scottish Parliament, which adjourned on 25 March 
1707, is hereby reconvened". The Scottish parliament gained 
wide ranging law making power, in a settlement not too dissim-
ilar from German federalism: Unless stated explicitly otherwise 
(the “reserved” issues such as defence), legislative competence 
rests with the Scottish Parliament by default. Unlike the German 
settlement however that was designed “fron the top” and gives 
identical rights to all regions, the asymmetric constitution, where 
each part gained its powers through individually negotiated and 
fought referenda, creates some anomalies. In the absence of a 
corresponding legislative body for England, Scottish Members 
of Parliament in Westminster continue to be able to vote for laws 
that will only affect England, while English MPs cannot any 
longer vote on decisions that are devolved to the Scottish Parlia-
ment and affect Scotland only.  
 
If the aim of the UK Labour party had been to “ward off” na-
tionalist sentiment in Scotland and supress through devolution 
any desire for full independence, then this hope was in vain. The 
Scottish National Party became under devolution the dominating 
political force in Scotland. Having won decisively the elections 
in 2011 with a clear commitment for a plebiscite on independ-
ence, the UK government offered to provide the Scottish Parlia-
ment with the powers to hold a referendum, and in 2012, the Ed-
inburgh Agreement between the UK and Scottish governments 
put in place the legal mechanisms to carry out the referendum 
under Scottish administration.   
 
The Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013 
was passed by the Scottish Parliament on 27.6.2013, receiving 
Royal Assent on 7.8.2013. As with the 1997 referendum, the 
franchise was defined inclusively: all UK, EU and common-
wealth citizens resident in Scotland for a set period of time were 
eligible to vote. However, while in 1997, the inclusive definition 
of the franchise had side-lined the discussion of what Scottish 
identity in constitutional law was going to be, this time round it 
became an explicit part of the nationalist project. The inclusive 
approach to nationality aligned with the plans of the SNP for a 
post-referendum, independent Scotland, where all lawful resi-
dents, English, European or from the commonwealth countries, 
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were to be offered Scottish citizenship, toleration of dual nation-
ality and protection of residency rights of those who chose not to 
take up that offer.   
 
On the 18th September 2014, Scotland voted with a 45-55 ma-
jority to remain in the UK. However, during a hard-fought cam-
paign, where polls at one point had indicated a majority for exit, 
the Westminster government had already indicate a willingness 
to far reaching concessions in the case of a No vote, and in par-
ticular substantially increased powers to vary income tax. These 
new powers are likely to come into law in 2016. While also the 
earlier Scotland Act of 1997 had granted some tax varying pow-
ers, these had been so limited that exercising them would have 
been in all likelihood been harmful for the Scottish economy. 
The new powers are not only more extensive, they come at a time 
where a right-of-centre government in Westminster pursues aus-
terity policies, while the more left-leaning Scottish government 
favours a much more interventionist and Keynesian approach. 
This means that the Scottish government is much more likely to 
make use of them at some point in the future. This requires an 
administrative infrastructure that allows the tax authorities to dis-
tinguish between Scots and non-Scots – or rather those affected 
by the regime and those who are not. This infrastructure however 
is not in place - the UK tax regime had no need to differentiate 
along the geographic boundaries of the nations that constitute the 
UK. The rate for UK income tax was uniform across the King-
dom, and since the Welsh and Northern Irish Assemblies do no 
have tax raising powers, and the English no separate parliament 
at all, there was also no need to co-ordinate centrally between 
separate regional income tax regimes.  
 
In this asymmetric environment, no existing register or data-
base matched exactly what the new tax rising regime in Edin-
burgh needed – and as we saw for understandable historical rea-
sons, as this would require the very debate was almost intention-
ally avoided through the centuries: what it means to have in ad-
dition to a British also a regional Scottish Identity. Nor is there a 
body similar to the German Bundesrat that could co-ordinate be-
tween the constituent states. Rather, the relation of each kingdom 
within the UK with the central government grew in ad ad-hoc, 
one-to-one basis where shifting power balances created a unique 
set of rights and rules for each of them, with no centralised mech-
anism to resolve the resulting tensions.  
 
In this power vacuum, administrative bodies and decision 
makers can often operate outside the public gaze, and nowhere 
more so than when decisions can be framed as abstract questions 
of ICT technology. The informal practices of UK administration 
(which relies much more on conventions and “understandings” 
than the comparatively legalistic and juridified system of conti-
nental Europe), government departments have always been able 
to commandeer the e-governance agenda to push decisions that 
ought to have been subject to public debate and accountability 
into technological questions to be answered by software devel-
opers - after appropriate instruction by senior civil servants.22 A 
much more daring argument along similar lines had been sug-
gested by Jon Agar in the Government Machine23, where he ar-
gued that the introduction of computers to control state action 
23 Agar, Jon. The government machine: A revolutionary history of the com-
puter. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003. 
was indeed close to a revolution in the technical sense of “over-
throwing the government”, led by civil servants and resulting in 
a new form of technocracy.    
 
Of the rationales given for the extended new database, its use 
for tax administration is the most unexpected – previous attempts 
to create a national ID database in the UK had presented them 
either as “crime and terrorism prevention” or “entitlement 
cards”. In the analysis here, it is however the most important, and 
arguably the main driver behind the project. The referenda of 
1996 and 2014 created a constitutional reality whose ramifica-
tions for everyday practice had never been properly planned. In 
such a situation, re-using what is available and bootstrapping on 
existing systems is a logical response. The critics of the proposed 
system are both right and wrong: They are right in that there are 
privacy implications that give rise to reasonable concerns, but 
not because of an attempt to introduce surveillance through the 
backdoor, but because it is an ad-hoc and unplanned response to 
needs created by the devolution referenda. The Information 
Commissioner is right in saying that ideally, such an important 
decision should come through Parliament, and after proper polit-
ical debate, but his analysis too underestimates what is at stake. 
The issue, ultimately, is not just if as a society we should have a 
system like the NHSCR, it is much more momentous than that – 
a national database needs to answer what it means to be part of 
that nation.  
 
That question had played out in the cultural and political arena 
ever since the union in 1707 and was an ever present undercur-
rent in the referenda debates, but never crystallised into legal 
form. In 1996, the UK government had intentionally framed the 
discussion so as to avoid an open debate on Scottish identity 
when it opened up the franchise to all and only residents. In 2014, 
the SNP campaigned on an equally inclusive concept of citizen-
ship, but its plans to translate this into a legal concept were ren-
dered moot when the electorate rejected independence. This also 
prevented the creation of a national constitutional convention, 
and an open public debate about a rational form of constitutional 
arrangement for the UK. In this political and legal vacuum, the 
choice of the NHSCR as a de facto national database could be 
described as inspired. The inclusive concept of membership that 
it inherits from its foundation as part of the modern welfare state 
and the NHS aligns it well with the inclusive understanding of 
the franchise that informed not just the 20th century referenda, 
but is much older and deeper ingrained. Above we located it first 
with the Darien scheme and the foundation of the Bank of Scot-
land, financial contribution to which gained in law Scottish citi-
zenship. With this the wheel comes full circle, for linking the use 
case for a national database to the question of taxation answers 
the question “who is Scottish” in a peculiar yet time honoured 
way: not by race, creed, or the accident of birth, but by the very 
material contribution to the collective good that one is willing to 
make.  
 
What this discussion also shows is that modern technology 
does not operate in a vacuum.  While we are often tempted to 
emphasise its disruptive nature and the radical break with the 
past that it heralds, and while the Internet’s global nature seems 
to render discussions about localism and local identity-forming 
practices moot, in reality, success or lack of it, uptake or rejection 
of technology is still intimately linked to social practices and 
modes of understanding that evolved over the centuries. This is 
true for international and inter-state relations, but it is equally 
true if less obvious for sub-national, intra-state questions. Coun-
tries with asymmetric constitutions in particular face a dual chal-
lenge when harnessing and regulating ICT: maintaining a bal-
ance between the needs of identities and identity-constituting 
practices that are in constant flux and a process of renegotiation, 
the ever-changing technological landscape, and the internal need 
of the law to fix both of them, at least temporarily, and give them 
explicit form.  
 
 
 
  
